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INTRODUCTION
For decades, citizens’ groups have been unsuccessful in stopping
legislators from creating their own political dynasties. Through
manipulation of the redistricting process, legislators and political parties
can remain in power indefinitely by choosing their own voters at the
expense of democracy. This has produced uncompetitive elections and
partisanship. Some states did away with legislative control of
redistricting and instituted nonpartisan commissions, which have been
somewhat successful.1 Florida voters enacted the Fair Districts
Amendments, which aimed to curb redistricting designed protect
incumbents or a political party. While the Florida Supreme Court and the
Leon County Circuit Court have invalidated maps designed with
unlawful intent, these changes haven’t gone far enough to effectuate the
intent of the voters and allow them to effectively choose their leadership
in Tallahassee.
In late 2011 and early 2012, political consultants worked with
legislators out of the public’s eye to create maps that would protect
incumbents and the Republican Party. These efforts were captured in
documents released by the Florida Supreme Court. As an attorney in the
redistricting cases notes, “the documents reveal in great detail how they
[political operatives] manipulated the public process to achieve their
partisan objectives.”2
1

See Steven F. Huefner, Don’t Make Redistricters Accountable to the People, Make
Them the People, 5 DUKE J. CONST. K. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (2010); compare with Peter
Miller & Bernard Grofman, Redistricting Commissions in the Western United States, 3
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 637 (2013).
2
See Associated Press, Supreme Court Unseals Documents About Redrawing of
Florida Districts, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014) http://www.tampabay.com/n
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It would be shortsighted to think that these problems are limited to
the redistricting process in Florida. But the United States Supreme Court
has been an ineffective route for pursuing remedies for partisan
gerrymandering. And political actors will be hesitant to end a practice
that ensures their political livelihood. Thus, it is up to the American
public to shift redistricting reform at the state level: through ballot
initiatives and pressure on legislators. Finally, some measures require
state courts to enforce the constitutional provisions requiring objectives
such as compactness. As this note explores, the simple passage of
redistricting reforms cannot rid the process of its ills while preserving the
legislature’s primacy in the redistricting process. The great lengths that
partisan consultants and leaders went to evade the Fair Districts
Amendment’s requirements show how important the redistricting process
is and how critical it is to protect Florida voters from gerrymandered
districts.
Part I of this note will explore the process of redistricting, its timing,
tactics, and impacts on Florida and the nation. Part II will explore the
relevant standards and case law guiding redistricting litigation. Then,
Part III will explore Florida’s redistricting litigation, before and after the
passage of the Fair Districts Amendments. Next, Part IV will analyze the
successes and failures of the Fair Districts Amendments. Finally, Part V
will explore potential solutions to partisan gerrymandering with a brief
look at other jurisdictions.

I.

THE REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Every ten years, the United States Census Bureau is charged with
tracking changes in the nation’s population, as required by Article I,
Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.3 This population data is then used to
determine the allocation of U.S. Representatives and state legislators.

A. Who Draws the Maps?
In most states, the duty to redistrict falls upon the legislature.4 In
most of these jurisdictions, redistricting bills are passed by each house of
the legislature, reconciled, and sent to the Governor for approval.5 In
ews/politics/supreme-court-unseals-documents-about-redrawing-of-voterdistricts/2207946.
3
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
4
See Justin Levitt, A Citizen’s Guide to Redistricting, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE,
1, 20 (2010) http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/CGR%20Reprint%
20Single%20Page.pdf.
5
Levitt, supra note 4.
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twenty-two states, redistricting commissions have a role in the
redistricting process.6 Of these states, six use wholly independent
commissions consisting of individuals who are not public servants, and
five states implement the commission model only if the legislature fails
to produce a constitutionally adequate map in time.7

B. How it Happens
After the primary redistricting body receives the population data, it
should move to draw districts of equal or nearly equal population
according to what are known as “traditional redistricting principles.”8 In
accordance with such principles, legislators should try to keep
communities of interest, such as cities, counties, and neighborhoods
intact.9 The districts should also be compact and contiguous (not
perforated) whenever possible, and comply with the Voting Rights Act
and U.S. Constitution. These principles and requirements are central to
the analysis of Florida’s Fair Districts Amendments.
Redistricting has a long tradition in American politics. Its muchmaligned cousin, the gerrymander, has endured almost as long.10 Black’s
Law Dictionary defines “gerrymandering” as “the practice of dividing a
geographical area into electoral districts, often of highly irregular shape,
to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the
opposition’s voting strength.”11 In a legislative body, the primary goal
for a majority party is to increase or preserve the majority. Generally, the
primary goal for a legislator in redistricting is to get re-elected. These
goals interact and influence the redistricting process. Even in states
where the population is equally distributed between the major parties, it
is possible for the majority party to gerrymander their way to an
unyielding majority. This can be accomplished in several different ways.
The tools of packing, cracking, and tacking provide the majority
party with tools to remain in power. A legislature may want to “pack” or
6

Id.
Id. at 21.
8
Id. at 40.
9
What is Redistricting?, REDISTRICTING CALIFORNIA, http://www.redistrictingca
.org/what-is-redistricting.
10
Around 1812, the term “gerrymander” was coined to refer to a plan by
Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry that would improve the chances of his
Democratic-Republican Party. One such district took the shape of a salamander.
Federalists combined the terms into a portmanteau known as “gerrymandering.”
However, his was not the first recorded instance of gerrymandering. See Emily Barasch,
The Twisted History of Gerrymandering in American Politics, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 19,
2012) http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/the-twisted-history-of-gerrym
andering-in-american-politics/262369/#slide1.
11
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 334 (4th pocket ed. 2011).
7
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cram the opposing party’s supporters into a few districts.12 This
guarantees that the opposition will win the district by large margins, but
the surrounding districts will lose opposition voters, making it easier for
the majority to win more competitive districts by small margins. In
contrast, “cracking” involves efforts to split the opposition’s supporters
so they do not have enough support in a single district to elect a
representative.13 Finally, the technique of “tacking” refers to the process
of reaching out from the core of a district to grab friendly voters, or
include an incumbent’s residence.14 The use of these techniques, often in
unison, gives the majority party an extra advantage in the elections to
come.
Gerrymandering produces a legislative body that is inconsistent with
the will of the voters. The 2010 elections were critical for the Republican
Party because they won control of many state legislatures, giving them
control of the decade’s redistricting process. In 2012, Democrats retained
the Presidency and gained Senate seats, while Democratic candidates for
the House of Representatives won more votes than their Republican
counterparts.15 However, they only won 46% of House seats.16 In swing
states with Republican legislatures, Democrats won Senate races but
carried only a fraction of swing-state congressional seats. In 2014, the
Republican majority won 57% of seats with 47% of the national vote.17
Barring a wave election, Republicans will control the House of
Representatives until 2022.18
In addition to producing inconsistent results, gerrymandering
produces excessive partisanship. Most districts are uncompetitive during
general elections, but sometimes have intense primary battles, where
candidates move closer to ideological extremes to avoid defeat in a

12

Levitt, supra note 4, at 57.
Id.
14
Id. at 58.
15
See Ian Millhiser, Democratic House Candidates Now Have a Nearly 1.2 Million
Vote Lead Over the Republicans, THINK PROGRESS (Dec. 21, 2012) http://thinkprog
ress.org/justice/2012/12/21/1351161/democratic-house-candidates-now-have-a-nearly12-million-vote-lead-over-the-republicans.
16
Id.
17
See Rebecca Ballhaus, Deep Loss by Democrats Obscures Party’s Numbers
Problem, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2014) http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/11/24/lossby-democrats-obscures-partys-numbers-problem.
18
Id. A “wave election” is an election in which one party makes substantial gains and
has few losses. 2010 was a “wave election” for the Republican Party in 2010, where they
won an additional 63 House seats and 4 Senate seats. See Wave Election, TAEGAN
GODDARD’S POLITICAL DICTIONARY (2015) http://politicaldictionary.com/words/waveelection.
13
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primary.19 Because candidates from both parties have moved further
from the center, Congress has become less productive and unable to
respond to our nation’s needs.20

II.

SUBSTANTIVE REDISTRICTING LIMITS AND STANDARDS

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Equal Protection Clause
provide a federal floor in which redistricting plans must meet. Beyond
these federal limits, states are free to impose additional limits on the
redistricting process.

A. The Voting Rights Act of 1965
The Voting Rights Act was enacted at the apex of the Civil Rights
movement as a means to ensure that African-Americans and other
minorities had a meaningful opportunity to participate in the political
process. Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act apply to the
redistricting process and require legislators to meet several benchmarks
to ensure minority representation. Legislative plans must comply with
these provisions to be valid.

1. Section 2 Requirements
Section 2 bans practices that make it more difficult for minority
voters to “participate in the political process” and to “elect
representatives of their choice.”21 Most Section 2 challenges involve
cases of vote dilution, which is the practice of reducing the effectiveness
of a group’s voting strength by limiting chances to turn that strength into
voting power.22 In 1982, the Senate amended Section 2 to allow plaintiffs
to establish a violation if they could prove, based on a totality of the
circumstances, that the challenged practice had the result of denying the
racial or language minority the equal opportunity to participate in the
19

As of 2013, only ninety seats in the House of Representatives have a partisan rating
that falls within five points of the national average. The Cook Partisan Voting Index
measures how strongly a district leans toward a party, in comparison with the nation as a
whole. See Hamilton Nolan, Gerrymandering is Eating Democracy, GAWKER (July 29,
2013) http://gawker.com/gerrymandering-is-eating-democracy-948842710.
20
See Mark Miller, Congress on Track to be the Least Productive in History, NBC
NEWS http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/congress-track-be-least-productive-mo
dern-history-n169546 (last visited Apr. 12, 2015).
21
Id.
22
See In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597,
622 (Fla. 2012) (hereinafter “Apportionment I”). Cracking and packing are common
techniques to dilute the voting power of minorities. For further discussion on
Apportionment I, see infra III.E.

	
  

2015]

FAIR DISTRICTS FLORIDA

195

political process.23 Four years later in Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme
Court held that Section 2 mandated the creation of plans24 used to project
a minority population if: (1) the minority project has population large
enough to form a majority in a single district, (2) the minority is
politically and geographically cohesive to support a single candidate, and
(3) non-minority voters usually opposite the majority’s preferred
candidate.25 The satisfaction of the Gingles factors may not be enough in
itself to prove vote dilution; the Court must look at the totality of the
circumstances to examine whether the minority vote has been
unreasonably diluted.26

2. Section 5 Requirements
Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shelby County v. Holder in
2013, state legislators in “covered jurisdictions” had to comply with
Section 5 requirements prohibiting discrimination in voting practices.27
Section 5 prohibits practices and procedures that have a discriminatory
effect.28 Under Section 5, a plan has a discriminatory effect under the
statute if, when compared to the benchmark plan, the submitting
jurisdiction cannot prove that the plan does not “result in a retrogression
in the position of racial minorities with the respect to their effective
23

Id.
Such as a majority-minority district. A majority-minority district is a legislative
district in which more than half of the population of voting age are racial or ethnic
minorities. See The Role of Section 2- Legal Requirements, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND
EDUCATION FUND, INC., http://redrawingthelines.org/legalrequirements (last visited Apr.
12, 2015).
25
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 93 (1986). The Senate listed factors that might
be probative of a Section 2 violation, including a history of official discrimination,
racially polarized voting, electoral practices that may enhance discrimination against a
minority group, a denial of access to a candidate slating process, discrimination in
education, employment or health which hinders the minority group’s ability to participate
in the political process, racial appeals in political campaigns, a lack of minority
candidates elected to public office, a lack of responsiveness to the needs of the minority
group, and that the policy underlying the use of a voting qualification is tenuous.
26
See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994). In Johnson, the Supreme Court
held that the Florida House’s failure to maximize majority-minority districts was not
enough to support a finding of vote dilution. The Court held that proportionality or a lack
of proportionality in electoral results and representation in and of itself cannot prove or
disprove a case of vote dilution.
27
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (holding unconstitutional the
coverage formula under Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act). Prior to Shelby County,
redistricting procedures and maps in certain covered jurisdictions must be cleared by the
Justice Department prior to implementation. These jurisdictions had histories of
discriminating against minority candidates. Without Section 4, Section 5 is
unenforceable.
28
42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
24
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exercise of their electoral franchise.”29 A proposed plan is retrogressive if
its net effect would reduce the effective exercise of the franchise, when
compared to the benchmark.30 In other words, if the change makes it less
likely that a protected minority group will be able to elect a
representative, the plan will be seen to be retrogressive under Section 5
and would be prohibited from going into effect.31

B. Racial Redistricting Limitations
It is not only important to protect minority populations so that they
can elect representatives, but also important to protect these populations
from being over-concentrated or packed in only a few districts, in order
to dilute their influence in other districts. While the Voting Rights Act
encourages the use of racial performance statistics to guard the ability of
a minority group to elect candidates, the Equal Protection Clause and the
Supreme Court’s line of racial gerrymandering cases provide limits to the
use of race in redistricting. In 1993, the Court held in Shaw v. Reno that
redistricting based upon racial considerations must be subject to strict
scrutiny.32 Two years later, the Court invalidated Georgia’s redistricting
plans designed with the intent of creating a third majority-minority
district.33 Additionally, the Equal Protection Clause’s ban on the use of
racial considerations only applies when race is the predominant factor in
redistricting.34 If political considerations play a role in the redistricting
process so that race alone is not the predominant factor, than the Equal
Protection Clause has not been violated.35 In Easley v. Cromartie, the
Court rejected the plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim because they could
not prove that racial motives were “dominant and controlling,” and that
political reasons could explain the packing of African-American voters

29

Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 125, 141 (1976).
Id.
31
Id.
32
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). Redistricting bodies should be conscious of
race to the extent that they must comply with Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
Shaw held that part of the danger of having seats that were created by a predominantly
partisan purpose was that representatives would feel like they were beholden to
mapmakers and certain groups rather than his or her entire constituency.
33
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 592 (1996)
(holding that complying with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was a compelling state
interest, but Texas’ plan was not narrowly tailored to further such an interest).
34
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001).
35
See id.
30
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into a “snakelike” district.36 The Supreme Court continues to hear racial
gerrymandering claims every decade.37

C. One-Person, One-Vote Requirements
Redistricting bodies have a duty to ensure that each congressional
district be equal in population “as nearly as is practicable.”38 Any
deviation from exact population equality usually must be justified by a
consistent state policy.39 Even granted a consistent state interest,
deviations that cause a one percent spread from the most populous
district to the least populous district will likely be held unconstitutional.40
When drawing state legislative lines, the redistricting bodies have a little
more leeway; the districts must only be “substantially equal.”41
Generally, courts will allow for deviations of up to ten percent; however,
larger deviations can be justified by compelling reasons, such as
compliance with the Voting Rights Act, while smaller deviations could
be seen as unacceptable if they are used to further partisan goals.42

D. Partisan Gerrymandering
While the Shaw line of racial gerrymandering cases offer a remedy
for redistricting efforts in which race predominates, there is no justiciable
federal standard to decide cases in which political interests are the major
factors in the redistricting efforts. While the Equal Protection Clause
provided a standard to apply to one-person one vote claims, courts had
repeatedly refused to weigh in on claims of partisan gerrymandering.43
In Davis v. Bandemer, Justice White required that plaintiffs prove
that voters have been “unconstitutionally denied their chance to
effectively influence the political process.”44 The Court held that the
36

Easley, 532 U.S. at 241-42.
See, e.g., Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015)
(holding that Alabama’s redistricting scheme was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander
because race was the predominant motive in redistricting).
38
See Wesberry v. Sanders, 367 U.S. 1 (1964).
39
Justin Levitt, All About Redistricting: Where are the Lines Drawn?, LOYOLA LAW
SCHOOL, http://redistricting.lls.edu/where.php.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
See id. (comparing Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993) with Larios v. Cox,
300 F. Supp 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (three judge court), aff’d sub nom. Cox v. Larios, 542
U.S. 947 (2004). In Voinovich, the Court upheld the redistricting plan, despite a deviation
over 10%, because the deviations were necessary to preserve county boundaries. In
Larios, the Court rejected a plan with 10% deviation, because there were no legitimate
reasons for such deviation.
43
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 120 (1986).
44
Id. at 124.
37
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plaintiffs failed to establish a continued inability to influence the political
process.45 Bandemer effectively foreclosed all political gerrymandering
claims.46 Courts have been extremely hesitant to intrude upon a
traditionally legislative function, and generally have deferred to state
legislatures, even in cases involving the most egregious of
gerrymandered maps.47
In 2004, the Supreme Court again took up a political gerrymandering
case.48 In Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court rejected a challenge to
Pennsylvania Republicans’ congressional redistricting scheme that
allegedly sought to balance out Democratic gains in redistricting in other
parts of the nation.49 A four-justice plurality held that such claims were
not justiciable and lacked constitutionally discernable standards of
review.50 Justice Kennedy concurred in judgment, writing that while such
a standard might be found in the future, none existed at the time.51
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer wrote separate dissents, arguing that
such claims were justiciable, but disagreeing on the standard to apply.52
Justice Stevens argued that the Court should have adopted an approach
like that adopted in Shaw, holding that plans with a predominant purpose
to achieve political gain were unconstitutional.53
Two years later, the Court again declined to step in to invalidate
another partisan gerrymander in League of United Latin American

45

Davis, 478 U.S. at 124.
See Laughlin McDonald, The Looming 2010 Census: A Proposed Judicially
Manageable Standard and Other Reform Options for Partisan Gerrymandering, 46
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 243, 248–49 (2009) (explaining that no political gerrymandering
claims have succeeded after Bandemer). In one case, Ragan v. Vosburgh, No. 96-2621,
1997 WL 168292, at *6 (4th Cir. 1997) the plaintiffs succeeded on such a claim
(involving a system of electing judges statewide), but the decision was rendered moot
after the state legislature adopted a new system of elections.
47
See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 143 (explaining that the Supreme Court does not have a
long tradition of intervention in redistricting cases); see also Heather K. Gerken, The
Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and its Progeny, 80
N.C. L. REV. 1411 (2002). Prior to Baker v. Carr, in 1962, such claims had been
dismissed as part of the “political question” doctrine, in which it was seen to be desirable
for courts to stay out of the “political thicket.” Baker, 369 U.S. 186. As many
commentators have noted, and as the line of political gerrymandering cases describe, the
courts have not been willing to venture into this “political thicket” in cases of mixed
motive, or to draw a line in which political gerrymandering would no longer be
acceptable from an Equal Protection standpoint. Id.
48
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
49
Id.
50
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267.
51
Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
52
Id. at 317-368 (Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, J., dissenting).
53
Id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46
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Citizens v. Perry.54 In 2003, the Texas Legislature redistricted after
Republicans won the Texas House of Representatives, modifying the
map made at the beginning of the decade to maximize Republican gains
in Congress.55 While some Texas Republicans admitted that political
gain was the sole motive, the Court again dismissed the claim of partisan
gerrymandering.56 While at least five Justices on the current Court
believe that a standard could be found, it seems like the most likely
remedy for a political gerrymander will be at the state level. The
Supreme Court has largely refused to intervene in political
gerrymandering matters.

III.

REDISTRICTING IN FLORIDA

A. Before Fair Districts
Florida is in the peculiar position of being a swing state on the
national level, but somewhat less competitive on a local level.57 While
Democrats outnumber Republicans in registered voters, Republicans
garner a super-majority in the State House of Representatives, and
twenty-six out of forty seats in the State Senate.58
Like in many other Southern states, Democrats traditionally
controlled the Florida Legislature and elected most governors. But by the
2000 election, their political fortunes had been reversed. Republicans
controlled seventy-five of 120 House seats and twenty-five of forty
Senate seats, putting them in the driver’s seat for the next redistricting
process.59 After a largely partisan redistricting process, Republicans
solidified their gains. Republicans were able to reduce “safe” Democratic
seats in the House from 53 to 46 and Democratic “leaning” seats from 7
to 3.60 By increasing the concentration of Democrats in safe seats, while
spreading Republican voters into several safe seats, Republicans were
54

League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (explaining
that the Texas redistricting effort was inherently suspicious because it took place during
the middle of the decade and without any other compelling reason to redistrict).
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
I would probably classify Florida as a “purplish” state. While President Barack
Obama won Florida twice, only three Democrats have won a statewide election in Florida
since 2000: Bill Nelson in 2000, 2006, and 2012; Chief Financial Officer Alex Sink in
2006; and Obama in 2008 and 2012.
58
See Devin Ombres, The Recent History of Gerrymandering in Florida: Revitalizing
Davis v. Bandemer and Florida’s Constitutional Requirements on Redistricting, 20
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 297 (2014).
59
Id. at 312.
60
Id. at 314.
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able to protect their majority.61 Barring a wave election, it would have
been nearly impossible for Democrats to win a majority of seats.62 The
same patterns held true for the Senate and congressional maps.63 During
the decade, only three congressional seats switched parties, and all
switched back to the Republican Party by the 2010 Election.64
Democrats challenged the maps in Martinez v. Bush
unsuccessfully.65 The plaintiffs failed to prove instances of intentional
discrimination or vote dilution under Section 2.66 Additionally, they were
unable to succeed on their political gerrymandering claim, in part due to
their inability to satisfy the demanding standards under Bandemer.67

B. The Fair Districts Amendments
Prior to the approval of Fair Districts, Florida’s constitutional
requirements guiding the redistricting process were no more stringent
than the requirements under the United States Constitution and the
Voting Rights Act.68 With the approval of the two amendments in 2010,
Fair Districts provided courts with a framework to apply for political
gerrymandering claims.

1. Adoption of Fair Districts
Wary of partisan gerrymandering, citizen groups gathered signatures
to put the Fair Districts Amendments on the ballot as Amendments 5 and
6. Both Amendments passed with almost 63% of the vote. According to
the chain of the Fair Districts campaign, the purpose of the Amendments
was to require legislators to draw districts “that make sense
geographically, and that are not rigged to achieve a political result
(emphasis added).” 69
The Florida Supreme Court, upon approving the Amendments for the
ballot, stated that the overall goal of the Amendments was twofold: “to
61

Ombres, supra note 58, at 317.
Id.
63
Id. at 316 (describing how Republicans were able to create another safe district in
Congress).
64
Id. at 321.
65
Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (S.D.Fla. 2002).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 598.
69
See Steve Bousquet, African American Legislators Split on Changing Redistricting
Method, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/leg
islature/african-american-legislators-split-on-changing-redistricting-method/1079561.
Mrs. Freidin later added that her organization’s goal was to level the playing field in
elections.
62
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require the Legislature to redistrict in a manner that prohibits favoritism
or discrimination, while respecting geographic considerations,” and “to
require legislative districts to follow existing community lines so that
districts are logically drawn, and bizarrely shaped districts . . . are
avoided.”70
With the approval of Florida voters, Amendments 5 and 6 were
codified in Article III of the Florida Constitution. Section 21 (a),
codifying Amendment 5, reads:
In establishing legislative district boundaries:
(a) No apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with
the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an
incumbent; and districts shall not be drawn with the
intent or result of denying or abridging the equal
opportunity of racial or language minorities to
participate in the political process or to diminish their
ability to elect representatives of their choice; and
districts shall consist of contiguous territory.
(b) Unless compliance with the standards in this
subsection conflicts with the standards in subsection (a)
or with federal law, districts shall be as nearly equal in
population as is practicable; districts shall be compact;
and districts shall, where feasible, utilize existing
political and geographical boundaries.
(c) The order in which the standards within sub-sections
(a) and (b) of this section are set forth shall not be read
to establish any priority of one standard over the other
within that subsection.71
Amendment 5 establishes limitations on redistricting in the Florida
House and Senate. Its corollary, Amendment 6, is codified in Section 20
of the Constitution, with almost identical language applying to
congressional redistricting.72 These limitations add a more
comprehensive framework to preexisting standards for the Florida courts
to apply.

70
71
72

	
  

Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 636.
Art III, §21(a), Fla. Const.
Art III, §21(b), Fla. Const.
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C. Applying the Standards
Justice Pariente, writing for the majority in Apportionment I,
provided the framework to apply Section 21 of the Florida Constitution.
The Florida Supreme Court can only act if the Florida Legislature fails to
follow constitutional requirements; the doctrine of separation of powers
requires judicial restraint to avoid injecting the Florida Supreme Court’s
personal views into a legislative matter.73 The Florida Supreme Court
should defer to the Florida Legislature and not wholly disregard policy
choices when those choices are not inconsistent with constitutional
standards.74
In analyzing the language of the Amendments, the Florida Supreme
Court found that in cases where “tier-one” standards (sub-section 21(a))
conflicted with “tier-two” standards (sub-section 21(b)), the Florida
Legislature should adhere to the requirements of tier-one before
complying with tier-two whenever practicable or feasible.75

1. Tier-One Standards
The requirement that no plan be drawn to favor a political party or
candidate is new to Florida, but contained in the laws of six other
states.76 While federal gerrymandering claims require excessive or
“invidious” intent, Florida’s Constitution prohibits any intent and applies
to both individual districts and the entire legislative plan.77 Because the
effects of a redistricting plan are predictable, the focus is on both direct
and circumstantial evidence of intent.78 The effects of a plan, the shape
of district lines, and the demographics of an area are all objective
indicators of intent.79 The Florida Supreme Court can consider all of the
evidence to reach such a conclusion.80
73

Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 606.
Id. at 608.
75
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 615.
76
Id. California and Washington have these provisions in their state constitutions.
Idaho, Iowa, Montana, and Oregon have statutory restraints on such redistricting motives.
Id. n.19. The Florida Supreme Court noted that previous instances of political
gerrymandering were an “unfortunate fact of political life around the country,” but not
illegal. See id. at 616 (citing Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1297 (S.D. Fla.
2002)); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
77
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 617.
78
Id. at 617. The effects of a redistricting plan are predictable for several reasons.
Legislators and consultants have access to advanced data that allows them to identify and
choose voters. More voters tend to identify with political parties and ideological
positions. They tend to be clustered in certain areas. Finally, these voters are relatively
loyal to a political party and its candidates.
79
Id.
80
Id.
74
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Such unconstitutional intent can be inferred by a departure from tiertwo redistricting principles without other justifications.81 The Florida
Supreme Court noted that a desire to maintain the integrity of political
subdivisions, and compact and contiguous districts would undermine
opportunities for political favoritism.82 Intent may be inferred when a
district’s shape is bizarre without countervailing justifications.83
Moreover, the manipulation of district lines to include or exclude
incumbents’ previous districts or current addresses could prove intent to
favor an incumbent.84
Section 21 (a) is consistent with the provisions of the Voting Rights
Act by preventing vote dilution and protecting the opportunity of a
minority group to elect a candidate of its choice.85 The protection of
minority voters may entail a modification of tier-two requirements,
though only to the extent necessary.86 However, if a plan goes beyond
what is necessary to avoid retrogression, it can be invalidated as an
impermissible racial gerrymander.87 The Florida Supreme Court required
a review of the 1) voting age population (VAP), 2) voter registration
data, 3) voter registration of actual voters, and 4) election results
history.88 The Florida Supreme Court rejected an argument that the
minority population in districts should not decrease (retrogress), but
instead, the above factors should be used in consideration to determine if
the minority group was still able to elect a candidate of choice.89
The last tier-one requirement is contiguity. The Florida Supreme
Court defined contiguous as “being in contact, touching along a
boundary or at a point.”90 If one point is isolated from the rest of the
district by another district, or only touches at a common angle, it is likely
to not be contiguous.91

81

Id.
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 617.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 618–19.
85
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 618-19. These requirements are in Section 2 and
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, respectively. While Section 5 requirements were
limited to covered jurisdictions, the minority voting protections here were extended
throughout the entire state.
86
Id. at 626.
87
Id. at 627 (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993)).
88
Id. at 627.
89
Id. The court held that legislature should not dismantle majority-minority districts,
or weaken other historically performing districts. Id. In coalition or crossover seats,
minority groups have the ability to elect candidates of choice, usually in conjunction with
other like-minded groups of voters. See id. at 625.
90
Id. at 628.
91
Id.
82
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2. Tier-Two Standards
First, Section 21 (b) requires legislators to make an “honest and good
faith effort” to construct districts “as nearly of equal population as
practicable,” balancing other legitimate considerations, and following
federal one-person, one-vote standards.92
The second tier-two requirement is compactness.93 The Florida
Constitution does not define the term, but the Florida Supreme Court
interpreted it to mean geographic compactness by reviewing the shape of
the district and by quantitative geometric measures of compactness such
as the “Reock method” and the “Area/Convex Hull method.”94 The
Constitution does not require the highest scores; some districts, such as
the district enclosing the Florida Keys, are naturally not compact.95
Additionally, this requirement may be superseded by other legitimate
considerations such as to keep the boundaries of political subdivisions.96
The final requirement under Section 21 (c) is to utilize existing
geographic and political boundaries where feasible.97 Generally, such
boundaries are utilized and keep communities of interest together.98 The
Florida Supreme Court approved the House’s choice to prioritize county
boundaries, while rejecting the Senate’s broad use of demarcations and
roadways, criticizing the approach as rendering the constitutional
provisions “meaningless and standardless.”99
Overall, the Florida Supreme Court noted that the goal of the second
tier requirements were to guard against gerrymandering, and to provide
the Court with indicators as to how well the Florida Legislature complied
with the tier-one formulae.100 The tier-two frameworks provide an
objective starting point for analyzing challenges to the maps.101 Finally,
the challengers to a redistricting plan should be able to proffer an
alternative plan to achieve the same constitutional objectives to protect
minorities without subordinating other standards.102 In other words, the

92

Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 630.
Id.
94
Id. at 634–35. The Reock Method, used by the Florida House, measures the ratio
between the area of the district and the area of the smallest circle that could fit around
that district. Id. The Area/Convex Method measures the ratio between the area of the
district and the area of the minimum complex polygon that can enclose the district. Id.
95
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 635.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 636.
98
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 637.
99
Id. at 638.
100
Id. at 639–40.
101
Id. at 640–41.
102
Id. at 641.
93

	
  

2015]

FAIR DISTRICTS FLORIDA

205

failure to produce a more feasible alternative could highlight the
difficulties in drawing such a district, rendering such a challenge moot.103

D. The 2010 Redistricting Cycle
Florida gained an additional two congressional seats after the 2010
Census. Florida’s Legislature once again set out to redraw its
congressional and state legislative districts. In early 2012, the Florida
Legislature passed the new maps, which were signed into law by
Governor Rick Scott. However, the redistricting process was not without
controversy.
Throughout 2011, the Florida Legislature held public hearings and
committee meetings in what was supposed to be a transparent
redistricting process.104 On the contrary, the redistricting process was
scarred by the revelation of secret meetings and strategies between
political consultants and legislators to conceal partisan intent behind their
redistricting plans. The Florida Supreme Court in November 2014
revealed emails that showed that consultants played a major role in the
redistricting process.105 Several maps were created by consultants, but
were submitted under the names of everyday citizens to avoid suspicion
that partisan consultants created the maps.106 Moreover, the documents
revealed some of the deliberations involved in the redistricting process.
One email noted that they had to correct the maps to include the home of
a Republican Senator.107 Another indicated that one plan would retire a
long-serving Republican Congressman.108 Finally, the maps revealed a
fundamental intent to redistrict for partisan advantage.109 One expert
noted that it would be impossible to draw the warped districts without

103

Id.
See FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Special Session 2014A Congressional
Redistricting, FLORIDA REDISTRICTING, http://www.floridaredistricting.org/ (last visited
Jan. 19, 2015).
105
See Brandon Larrabee, Redistricting Process Under Scrutiny, HERALD-TRIBUNE
(Nov. 26, 2014) http://politics.heraldtribune.com/2014/11/26/redistricting-process-scrutin
y/.
106
See id.
107
See Peter Schorsch, Read Here: The Trove of Redistricting Documents the Florida
GOP Sought to Keep Secret, SAINT PETERSBLOG (Nov. 23, 2014) http://www.saintpeters
blog.com/archives/167956. The documents are available at https://www.scribd.com/doc
/247933322/The-Redistricting-Documents-The-Florida-GOP-Fought-To-Keep-Secret.
108
See Peter Schorsch, Read Here: The Trove of Redistricting Documents the Florida
GOP Sought to Keep Secret, SAINT PETERSBLOG (Nov. 23, 2014) http://www.saintpetersb
log.com/archives/167956.
109
See Schorsch PDF file, supra note 107, at 8. “I count 28 R seats, 29 if you were able
to pick up the new Hispanic seat in Orlando.”
104
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such a bias; while another noted that the maps were the most biased that
he had ever seen.110
The approved 2010 maps did not differ much from the maps in the
2000 redistricting cycle. In the Florida House, Democrats gained three
safe seats, but lost two seats that potentially leaned Democratic.111 The
Senate plan created an additional Republican-leaning district, while
costing Democrats a safe seat.112 Additionally, the congressional map
consolidated Republican gains in the past decade, bolstering some
Republican seats.113 On the whole, Democratic seats were made more
Democratic, and safe Republican seats slightly more Republican, so as to
maximize safe Republican seats, protecting their majority.114

E. Apportionment I
Under the Florida Constitution, the Attorney General is required to
petition the Florida Supreme Court for declaratory judgment within
fifteen days of the passage of the apportionment plan, and the Supreme
Court is required to enter judgment within thirty days of the petition.115
On February 9th, 2014, the Senate passed Senate Joint Resolution 1176,
apportioning the state into 120 House and 40 Senate districts.116 The
Supreme Court, after holding oral argument, approved the Florida House
map, but rejected several districts in the Florida Senate’s plan.117

1. Challenges
The Florida Democratic Party (“FDP”) and a coalition of groups
including the League of Women Voters of Florida, the National Council
of La Raza, and Common Cause Florida (“Coalition”) challenged that
the redistricting plans violated the Florida Constitution.
First, they argued that a statistical analysis of the plans revealed an
overwhelming partisan bias in registration and election results.118 Voter
registration statistics revealed that Republicans had an advantage in 22 of
40 Senate districts and 61 of 120 House districts.119 Additionally, the
Republican Governor would have won in 26 Senate districts and 73
110

Paula Dockery, Fair District Amendments Make Impact. THE LEDGER (June 18,
2014) http://www.theledger.com/article/20140618/COLUMNISTS0309/140619229.
111
See Ombres, supra note 58, at 323.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Art. III, § 16(e), Fla. Const.
116
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 600.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 641.
119
Id. at 642.
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House districts despite winning only 50.6% of the two-party vote.120
While the Florida Supreme Court held that these statistics might be
depictive of a lack of political fairness, these statistics go to effect and
not improper intent.121 In fact, Democratic voters tend to cluster in urban
areas, creating a natural “packing” effect.122 Additionally, this imbalance
could be the result of the required compliance with the Voting Rights
Act.123 Finally, unlike states that encourage competitive districts,
Florida’s Constitution does not require a balanced map, or proportional
representation, but merely a neutral map without improper intent
involved.124

a. House Map and House District
Analysis
The Florida Supreme Court approved the plans for the Florida House
without modifications.125 The court found no evidence of improper
intent, and further, compliance with the tier-two standards was designed
to serve as a bellwether for a political gerrymander.126 The challengers
failed to find any retrogression in the overall plan or evidence of a racial
gerrymander.127 Most districts were compact, and the few irregular
districts were justified by compliance with the Voting Rights Act or
natural geography.128 Finally, the Florida Supreme Court found that the
House’s use of county boundaries whenever possible was a consistent
and reasoned approach.129
After reviewing the map as a whole, the Florida Supreme Court
examined and approved the districts challenged by the FDP and
Coalition. In some cases, tier-two formulae were not satisfied, but were
justified by compelling reasons, foremost, preserving minority voting
strength130. Districts 70, 88, 115, and 117 were all challenged for lack of
compactness, while 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 115, and 117 were
challenged for failure to utilize municipal boundaries.131 However, all
these districts had large minority protections that warranted protection
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

	
  

Id.
Id.
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 643.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 644–45.
Id. at 645.
Id. at 645.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 647–53.
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from retrogression under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and tier-one
of the Florida Constitution’s requirements.132 The Florida Supreme Court
held that the Florida Legislature was limited in options in these districts,
and the challengers could not redraw them without retrogressive effect.133

b. Senate Map and Senate District
Analysis
While the Florida Supreme Court held that the Florida House made
adequate efforts to comply with Florida’s anti-gerrymandering
amendment, it found that the Florida Senate made little modifications to
the partisan map in 2002, and ordered the Senate to modify its map.134
The Senate plan as a whole demonstrated a clear pattern of
unconstitutional intent.135 Incumbents were spared challenges against
other incumbents, and were given large parts of their prior
constituencies.136 Moreover, the Senate’s renumbering process benefitted
incumbents to allow them to serve longer than the constitutional term
limits.137 Furthermore, 70% of overpopulated districts were Republicanperforming districts used to shore up Republican support in these
seats.138 Additionally, a number of districts had low compactness
scores.139 Finally, the Senate’s choice of political boundaries was
inconsistent throughout the map.140
The numbering of a Senate district is critical because it determines
the years in which Senate elections are held, and the eligibility of
Senators for election.141 Under the Senate’s plan, odd-numbered districts
were assigned to those senators elected to terms of two years or less prior
132

Id.
Id.
134
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 653.
135
Id. at 654.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 654.
139
Id. at 656.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 657. See Art. III, §15(a-b), Fla. Const. Elections for Senate in odd-numbered
districts are held in the years the numbers of which are multiples of four, whilst evennumbered districts hold elections in the even-numbered years that are not multiples of
four. Id. Additionally, the next election after a reapportionment, some senators shall be
elected for two-year terms to maintain staggered terms. Id. Florida law limits the length
of a legislator’s term by preventing those who have served in office for eight consecutive
years from seeking re-election. Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 657. By adding the
staggered two-year terms, most Senators could serve a maximum of ten years in office.
Id.
133

	
  

2015]

FAIR DISTRICTS FLORIDA

209

to redistricting, and even-numbered districts assigned to those elected to
four year terms prior to redistricting.142 In effect, almost every incumbent
was given an opportunity to serve additional years, both frustrating the
intent of the term-limits amendment, and advantaging incumbents as
prohibited by the Fair Districts Amendment.143
The Senate established District 1 in order to keep the coastal districts
of Florida’s panhandle together.144 By doing so, however, it sacrificed
compactness, and concerns for political boundaries, splitting five
counties, and switching between different boundaries such as major and
minor roads, and various geographical features.145 The Florida Supreme
Court held that because compactness, a tier-two requirement, was
sacrificed for a non-compelling need, the district was constitutionally
invalid.146
Senate Districts 6 and 9 are bordering districts in Northeast Florida
that were challenged for using the minority voting protections as a
pretext for partisan favoritism. The State proffered that the district was
formed to promote minority-voting opportunities, but neither the district
nor its predecessor contained a majority black population.147 The Florida
Supreme Court sided with the challengers because their alternative
District 6 was more compact, was wholly contained in Duval County,
and preserved minority voting populations.148 Additionally, because
District 9’s lack of compactness was the result of District 6’s
configuration, it was unconstitutional as well.149

142

Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 661.
Id. at 659–61.
144
Id. at 663.
145
Id. Senate District 1 had a Reock score of 0.12, where more compact districts are
closer to 1. The Coalition’s alternative map only split one county in the Panhandle. Id.
146
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 665. The goal to create an urban and a rural
district could be a rational state interest, but other tier-two constraints such as equal
population requirements, or to follow municipal or county boundaries would be more
compelling. Id. The fact that both Districts 1 and 3 kept over 80% of their predecessor
districts’ population was noted by the court and could signal an intent to aid incumbents.
Id.
147
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 665.
148
Id. at 668–69. While the alternative district had a smaller black voting-age
population (VAP), the Florida Supreme Court found that the district would be a
Democratic-performing district, and that Black voters would control the Democratic
primary, consisting of 64% of primary voters, affording black voters the opportunity to
elect their preferred candidates. Id. It also was much more compact (0.32 Reock score).
Id.
149
Id. at 669. District 6 was drawn to take in Democratic neighborhoods, making the
surrounding districts less Democratic. Id. Again, the districts retained most of the
population from the 2002 map, which had no limitations on partisan gerrymandering. Id.
143
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Districts 10 and 12 were challenged on the grounds of partisan
favoritism.150 District 10 is fairly compact, but contains a 12-mile long
appendage in between Districts 12 and 13.151 The appendage was on
average only a few miles in width, and contained the home of an
incumbent Senator.152 Because District 10 was visually non-compact,
contained an appendage to reach out to encompass an incumbent, and
could not be justified on the basis of protecting minority-voting strength,
it was constitutionally invalid.153
Much like District 1, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated District
30 because it was non-compact, and split geographic counties.154 The
Florida Legislature claimed that the purpose of the district was to tie
coastal communities together, but the court invalidated the district
because this interest cannot come at the expense of required
constitutional standards.155
Finally, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated Districts 29 and 34,
in Southeast Florida, which had similar departures from compactness and
political boundary standards that led to the conclusion of improper
intent.156 District 34 was a 50-mile long, narrow district stretching from
Northern Palm Beach County into Southern Broward County, slicing
through neighborhoods and cities along the way.157 District 34 bordered
to the north of District 29, and then traveled alongside its eastern
boundary along the coastline.158 The Senate tried to justify compliance
with minority protection by noting that District 34 had a 56% VAP.159
Like Districts 6 and 9, the challengers submitted an alternative that was
more compact and complied with minority protection requirements.160
The Court concluded that District 34 was drawn to take Democratic
150

Id.
Id. at 670.
152
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 670. In Senate floor debate, it was asked whether
an incumbent lived in the appendage. See id. n. 50. The reply response indicated that it
was unknown whether an incumbent lived in the appendage, though the incumbent was
present at the debate. Id.
153
Id. at 671. An appendage added to an otherwise compact redistrict can violate the
requirement of compact districting. Id. (citing Hickel v. Se. Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 45
(Alaska 1992)).
154
Id. at 672.
155
Id. at 673. District 30 was described as an “upside-down alligator” and contained
much of the same constituency as the former district.
156
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 673.
157
Id. at 674.
158
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 674.
159
Id. at 675.
160
Id. at 674–75. District 29 had a Reock score of 0.15, while 34 had the lowest Reock
score of just 0.05. Id. The challengers’ replacement map improved on these scores. Id at
678. Additionally, the new map would also have a majority-minority district. Id.
151
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voters out of District 29, creating a plan that made District 34 a
competitive, Republican-leaning seat.161 It found that the lack of
compliance with tier-two standards was designed for political gain.162
The FDP challenged several other districts unsuccessfully.163 In these
cases, the Court found that the shape of the districts was explained by a
compelling interest, and that the challengers failed to meet the burden of
improper intent.164 In Districts 4, 25, and 26, the FDP failed to
demonstrate a method that would avoid splitting county lines.165 In
Districts 15, 28, and 33, the FDP failed to show indicators of intent or
departure from traditional redistricting principles.166 Finally, the FDP
challenged that Districts 35 and 36, and 38 were over-packed with
Democrats to dilute the Democratic vote in other districts.167 In both
challenges, the alternative plan would result in retrogression while
decreasing compactness.168

2. Redrawing the Map
Holding that Districts 1, 3, 6, 9, 10, 29, 30, and 34 were invalid, the
Court directed the Florida Legislature to redraw the districts in
compliance with Florida’s constitutional standards.169 The Florida
Legislature was not required to redraw the entire plan.170 The Florida
Legislature convened for a special session to approve the maps in March
2012, by Senate Joint Resolution 2-B.171 Once again, the Florida
Supreme Court was constitutionally obligated to review the Senate
map.172 However, this time, by a per curiam opinion, the revised Senate
map was approved for use for the next election cycle.173

a. Changes to the New Map
The Florida Legislature modified parts of twenty-six of the original
forty districts in their new plan.174 The FDP and Coalition again
161

Id. at 675.
Id.
163
Id. at 679.
164
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 679–80.
165
Id. at 679.
166
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 679.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 680.
169
Id. at 685.
170
See In Re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 2-B, 89 So. 3d 872,
879–80 (Fla. 2012) (hereinafter Apportionment II).
171
Id. at 880.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 881.
174
Id. at 880.
162
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challenged that the entire plan contained improper intent, but the Court
found no new evidence of such intent.175 They also claimed that the
Florida Legislature did not materially alter the previously non-complying
districts when it re-drew the plan.176

b. Unchallenged Districts
The Florida Legislature made some changes to the first map that
clearly complied with the new standards, so that the FDP and Coalition
declined to challenge them.177 District 1 was redrawn to increase
compactness while only splitting Okaloosa County.178 Additionally,
District 23 (former District 30) became more compact, and took in much
less of the former district.179 Finally, Districts 29 and 34 were redrawn to
become more compact, and exhibited less partisan favoritism.180

c. Challenged Districts
The challengers alleged that District 8 was still non-compact, split
counties, and was drawn to split the Democratic portion of Daytona
Beach.181 District 8 contains much of the southern portion of former
District 6.182 The Court upheld this district, holding that the Senate map
was the most compact, and that ensuring population equality justified
splitting the city of Daytona Beach.183 The Court also noted that the
Coalition’s claim of partisan intent was weak in that the change had a
minor impact on the district’s partisan balance.184
175

Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 882.
Id. at 883.
177
Id. at 887.
178
Id. Former Districts 1 and 3 split five counties. New District 3 contains the entirety
of eleven counties in the district. See District Maps, THE FLA. SENATE,
http://www.flsenate.gov/Senators/Districts (last visited Jan. 19, 2015) (displaying the
approved Senate map).
179
Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 887. Former District 30 had contained 84.9%
of the predecessor District; District 23 contained 59.8%. Id.
180
Id. at 877–79.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 887.
183
Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 888.
184
Id. In the Senate plan, and the proposed alternatives, redrawn District 6 remains a
solidly Republican district, while District 8 is competitive during presidential election
cycles; see Dorothy Hukill, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Dorothy_Hukill. Former
Representative Dorothy Hukill won 57% of the vote in the 2012 Senate Election in
District 8 and ran unopposed in 2014); see also 2014 General Election Active Registered
Voters by Senate District, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE (Oct. 18, 2014, 10:13 AM)
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/statistics/pdf/2014/GEN2014_CountyPa
rtySenateDist.pdf. Registered Democrats outnumber registered Republicans in this
district by 1,828 voters as of the 2014 general election.
176
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The Court approved Districts 10, 13, and 14 over challenges on
grounds of compactness and that they favored incumbents.185 Old District
10 contained an appendage; however the Senate concluded that it could
not remove the appendage without impairing minority rights in bordering
districts.186 Additionally, the new District 13 had little of its predecessor
district, and drew two incumbent legislators together.187
In new Districts 21 and 26, the Court found that challengers failed to
establish violations with the new map, finding that county lines were
followed, and the maps were relatively compact.188
The Court approved the remainder of the map for the 2012 elections.
Additionally, it approved of the Florida Legislature’s renumbering
scheme, which assigned a lottery method for randomly assigning districts
with odd or even numbers.189

d. Concurrences
Justice Pariente concurred, holding that the challengers failed to find
constitutional flaws in the map, but cited barriers to the effective
execution of the voters’ will. Justice Pariente found that time constraints
made the fact-finding process more difficult, preventing the Court from
testing the depth and complexity of the assertions made.190 The Court had
a thirty-day window to review complex maps and had to clear the maps
before the candidate qualifying period.191
Next, Justice Pariente examined the “intent” requirement of 21(a).192
Intent is separate from impact, and is a difficult inquiry, to be resolved
using tier-two objective standards.193 Justice Pariente found no new
evidence of improper intent, but suggested that potentially, a partisan
185

Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 888.
Id. at 889. The elimination of the appendage would have meant that black voters
would not have controlled the Democratic primary, making it less likely that minority
voters could elect a representative.
187
Id. New Districts 10 and 13 have performed Republican in 2012 and 2014 and
Republicans have a 54% and 52% proportion of the voters registered to vote with the two
major parties in these districts, respectively. District 12 is Democratic performing and
Democrats have 69% of the two-party registered voters in this district.
188
Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 890.
189
Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 880; see also Mary Ellen Klas, Lottery Style
Drawing Caps Strange Day of Redistricting Debate, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Mar. 21, 2012,
8:06 PM) http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/lottery-style-drawing-caps-strange-dayof-redistricting-debate/1221212 (describing the lottery process, with the Senate President
declaring the lottery the “most incumbent-neutral and random method that the Senate
committee on reapportionment could devise”).
190
Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 892 (Pariente, J., concurring).
191
Id.
192
Id. at 895.
193
Id.
186
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imbalance could be used to invalidate an entire plan.194 With the burden
of proof on the challengers, it is difficult to effectuate the majority’s
standards, because any redrawing of lines will have political
consequences, regardless of intent.195 To separate actual intent from
alleged intent is a difficult task, indeed. Justice Pariente questioned
whether the intent of the Amendment could be carried out with
legislators in charge of redistricting, suggesting that an independent
redistricting body could bring about the desired results.196
Justice Perry concurred and dissented in holding that District 8 was
improperly split, diluting black voters around Bethune Cookman
University in Daytona Beach, in order to create two Republican
districts.197 Justice Perry wrote that although a majority-minority district
was not required, the district contradicts the requirements, allowing the
Florida Legislature to split a minority group before it can reach a
majority-voting bloc.198

F. Florida’s Congressional Map
Unlike Florida’s legislative maps, which are automatically subject to
facial review by the Florida Supreme Court, congressional maps must be
challenged as part of an as-applied challenge in a circuit court. 199
In early 2012, multiple groups filed suit in a Leon County Circuit
Court to challenge Florida’s congressional map.200 After a lengthy bench
trial, in July 2014, Judge Terry P. Lewis found congressional districts 5
and 10 to have violated the Florida Constitution, rendering the map
unconstitutional.201

194

Id. at 897 (Pariente, J., concurring). Justice Pariente suggests that defining a
threshold would be very difficult. Perhaps this is similar to the challenges faced by the
United States Supreme Court in Vieth.
195
Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 898.
196
Id. at 897.
197
Id. at 898 (Perry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
198
Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 901. Justice Perry worries that approving
District 8 would set a precedent that would make it difficult to challenge the district
because it wouldn’t be “retrogressive” from that point onward. Additionally, he wrote
that the new districts failed to follow consistent geographical boundaries.
199
See Peter Schorsch, Judge Rejects Legislature’s request to dismiss challenge to
Senate redistricting plan, SAINTPETERSBLOG (Jan. 17, 2013) http://www.saintpetersblog.c
om/archives/82626 (In as-applied challenges, circuit courts can consider the facts of the
case as well as the law. The Florida Supreme Court does not handle as-applied
challenges).
200
These cases were consolidated to form Romo v. Detzner, No. 2012-CA 000412,
2014 WL 3797315, *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 10, 2014) (hereinafter “Romo”).
201
Id. at *3-4. Judge Lewis held that the inquiry was into the process, end result, and
motive behind the legislation.
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1. Congressional Districts 5 and 10
Congressional District 5 immediately failed the tier-two
requirements as it was visually non-compact, bizarrely shaped, wound all
the way down from Jacksonville to Orlando, featured an appendage into
District 7, and followed few political boundaries.202 The Florida
Legislature’s justification for the district was compliance with minority
voting protections by creating a majority-minority district.203 However,
the plaintiffs showed that a more compact district could have been drawn
without being retrogressive; the last map had only a plurality black
population.204 Nor was the population large enough or geographically
compact for the Voting Rights Act to require a majority-minority
district.205 Finally, the appendage into District 7 appeared to be drawn to
favor the Republican Party by capturing the area’s minority
population.206 Because of the failure to meet tier-two principles, and a
finding of intent to benefit the Republican Party, District 5 was
invalid.207
While District 10 was mostly compact, it contained an appendage
that wrapped under and around District 5.208 The Florida Legislature
claimed that it was necessary to protect the minority voting protections in
bordering Districts 5 and 9, but Judge Lewis found that it was
unnecessary to avoid retrogressive effect.209 The appendage also
improved the re-election odds for Republican incumbent Congressman
Webster.210 Much like bordering District 5, a lack of compactness
combined with unconstitutional intent rendered the district
unconstitutional.211

202

Id. at *16. According to the Florida Supreme Court in Apportionment I, appendages
render a district not compact and should be avoided unless necessary to fulfill tier-one
principles, mainly protecting minority voting strength.
203
Romo, No. 2012-CA-412, 2014 WL 3797315 at *16.
204
Id. The previous district also elected an African-American to Congress despite not
having a majority-minority population.
205
Id. Gingles requires that the minority population be geographically compact and
cohesive; this district connects two distant urban populations and a black rural population
connecting the two.
206
Id. The proposed changes to District 7 decreased the number of registered
Democrats in that district by 1%.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Romo, No. 2012-CA-412, 2014 WL 3797315 at *17.
210
Id. The number of registered Democrats was reduced from 37.2% to 36.8%.
211
Id. at *18.
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2. Fixing the Congressional Map
The Florida Legislature was ordered to withdraw the congressional
map to fix Districts 5 and 10.212 Legislative leaders made slight fixes to
the invalid maps and approved them to be sent back to the Leon County
Circuit Court for approval.213 The map made changes in seven districts
and attempted to make the districts more visually and mathematically
compact and adhered to geographical boundaries.214 The legislative
leaders noted the lack of partisan operatives during the new process.215
However, the League of Women Voters claimed that the new plan made
only slight alterations and would not correct the constitutional defects of
the old plan.216
On August 22, 2014, Judge Lewis approved the changes to the
congressional map.217 The plaintiffs again challenged the districts,
offering an East-West configuration in place of the new District 5, which
went from North to South.218 The Florida Legislature’s changes did
remedy some of the previous district’s flaws by becoming more compact
and removing the appendage.219 Additionally, District 10’s appendage
was removed.220 Because the new districts remedied the old maps’ tiertwo constitutional flaws, the Court had no choice but to accept the
map.221 Because the map was approved so close to the 2014 elections,
presenting legal and logistical hurdles, the Court held that the 2012 map
would be used for the 2014 cycle.222 The plaintiffs appealed and placed
the question before the Florida Supreme Court as a question of great

212

Romo, No. 2012-CA-412, 2014 WL 3797315 at *18.
See Mary Ellen Klas, Florida Legislature Opens Session with Plan for Modest
Redistricting Map Changes, MIAMI HERALD (Aug 7, 2014) http://www.miamiherald.com
/news/politics-government/article1978732.html.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
See Order Approving Remedial Plan, Romo v. Detzner, No. 2012CA-412, 2014 WL
4261829 at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 22, 2014).
218
Id.
219
Id. at *2.
220
Id.
221
See id. (“My duty is not to select the best plan, but rather to decide whether the one
adopted by the legislature is valid.”).
222
Order Approving Remedial Plan, 2014 WL 4261829 at *1. Florida was one of the
last states to complete the redistricting process, leaving little time for the circuit court to
review the plan’s constitutionality.
213
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public importance.223 The Court accepted jurisdiction and will hold oral
argument on March 4, 2015.224

IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE FAIR DISTRICTS AMENDMENTS

Did the Fair Districts Amendments to the Florida Constitution
prevent the kind of nefarious partisan gerrymandering that they were
designed to prevent? It’s certainly not an easy question to answer. First,
although we now know that partisan operatives played a role in the
creation of the maps, we cannot precisely decipher the actual intent of
each boundary drawn, whether each district was created for political gain
or for a more legitimate reason. The set of tier-two criteria provide a
modest baseline, but a shrewd legislature can craft districts that satisfy
tier-two criteria while preserving political advantage. Finally,
gerrymandering is most effective in the aggregate; by creating a majority
of favorable, non-competitive districts, the voting majority can guarantee
that they have enough votes to pass a legislative agenda. The Florida
Supreme Court and Leon County Circuit Court forced changes to the
maps that made the affected districts slightly fairer. But the courts’
limitations to finding intent in the entire map constrained their ability to
effectuate the intent of the Amendments.

A. Intent vs. Effect
As Justice Pariente noted in her concurrence in Apportionment II,
challengers are limited by the burden of proving improper intent in a
redistricting plan. As drafted, the tier-two requirements allow the Florida
Supreme Court to examine intent. Additionally, the Florida Supreme
Court can and should consider outside factors such as the role of
consultants in the map-making process. But during the next redistricting
process, consultants will likely make better efforts to conceal their role in
the process. The Florida Supreme Court in Apportionment I held that
while political effects could serve as objective indicators of intent, the
Florida Constitution prohibits only intent, not disparate political
effects.225
223

See League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 39 Fla. L. Weekly D2079 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2014).
224
League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, No. SC14-1905, 2014 WL 5502409, at
*1 (Fla. October 23, 2014). The Florida Supreme Court will have the opportunity to
apply the Fair Districts standards and perform a review of the congressional map.
225
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 617. Laughlin McDonald’s nationwide standard
would include predominant partisan purpose and disproportionate electoral results as
elements of an unconstitutional gerrymander; see also Laughlin McDonald, supra note
46. Laughlin McDonald’s nationwide standard would include predominant partisan
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While proportional representation is not required, disparate political
effects should play a greater role in the finding of improper intent.226 The
political impacts of gerrymandering are predictable to anybody with
access to sophisticated political data.227 Moreover, gerrymandering is
designed to create policies that favor a party and incumbents. The Florida
Supreme Court should take a more extensive look at the political impacts
of an entire redistricting plan and consider that improper intent may
persist although tier-two flaws are fixed. A review of the redistricting
plans reveals that the decisions of the courts did little to mitigate the
political effects (and thus likely political intent of the legislature).
There are drawbacks to adopting such an approach. The Voting
Rights Act, and demographic clustering tend to skew electoral results
away from proportionality. Incumbent success occurs nationwide, and
even in states in which commissions control redistricting.228 The Florida
Supreme Court considered this approach, and noted that redistricting
inherently has political effects, benefitting one party over the other.229
However, if the purpose of the Amendments was to level the playing
field, a more extensive look at election results must be incorporated.

B. Comparing House and Senate plans
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the House map
while rejecting the Senate map can be explained in part by the House’s
purpose and disproportionate electoral results as elements of an unconstitutional
gerrymander; see also Ethan Weiss, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Elusive Standard,
53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 693, 721 (2013). Ethan Weiss suggests adopting the Arlington
Heights test, which looks at an unequal burden on one group, the historical background of
the decision, the sequence of events leading up to the decision, legislative history, and
other background circumstances.
226
Proportional representation generally refers to a system where parties receive a
number of seats based upon the percentage of the vote that they received. A party that
wins 40% of the vote would win around 40% of seats.
227
Political consultants, legislators, and even knowledgeable bloggers can easily
estimate the political impacts of redistricting, and even create their own maps using
online tools.
228
See Devin McCarthy, Did the Cal. Redistricting Comm’n Really Create More
Competitive Dist’s?, FAIR VOTE (Nov. 26, 2013) http://www.fairvote.org/research-andanalysis/blog/did-the-california-citizens-redistricting-commission-really-create-morecompetitive-districts/. Incumbents benefit from other factors including advantages in
name recognition and political successes in bringing money and jobs back to their
districts.
229
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 617 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). The Leon County Circuit Court took a
closer look at the role of partisan consultants, as part of an as applied review of the
redistricting process. It also utilized some of the Arlington Heights factors as part of its
review and as suggested by Weiss.
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efforts to comply with Fair Districts, in contrast with the Senate’s effort
to skirt the requirements.
One commentator praised the House’s map as a “model plan,”
although it would be extremely unlikely for Democrats to achieve a
majority in this decade.230 Blogger Dave Trotter argued that House
Republicans have “gotten smarter” allowing them to create majority
districts that also complied with the constitutional requirements.231 Such
a map is a reminder that a durable majority can be built without creating
bizarrely shaped districts. Unless a court is committed to weighing
partisan effects to invalidate an entire map, such a redistricting practice
can likely survive Florida’s new constitutional standards. In other words,
if a majority creates a map that complies with tier-two and minority
protection requirements, it likely will be upheld. Such a redistricting
strategy might be more effective than combating the constitutional
standards directly, as the Senate tried.232
While the House map was generally regarded as fair, the Senate’s
map ignored tier-two requirements while protecting incumbents. But
when Republicans were tasked to redraw the districts, Republicans made
the districts look “nicer”, but the districts were “pretty much the
same.”233 By fixing the constitutional defects in the eight invalidated
districts, the Senate was able to preserve a map that had been produced
with unconstitutional intent.
Democrats under the new map would still have little chance at
achieving a Senate majority.234 Even with heightened antigerrymandering standards, the approved Senate map is not too different
230

Dave Trotter, Understanding Republican Redistricting, THE POLITICAL HURRICANE
(Mar. 22, 2012) http://thepoliticalhurricane.com/2012/03/22/understanding-republican-re
districting-the-district-45-project/.
231
Id.; see also Kartik Krishnaiyer, Redistricting Saga: Senate Still Does Not Get It,
THE POLITICAL HURRICANE (Mar. 18, 2012) http://thepoliticalhurricane.com/2012/03/18/r
edistricting-saga-senate-still-does-not-get-it/ (stating that the State House understood the
mandate from the voters in a way that the Senate failed to grasp).
232
See Fla. H. R. Elections, 2012, BALLOTPEDIA http://ballotpedia.org/Florida_House_
of_Representatives_elections,_2012. Democrats picked up 7 seats in the Florida House of
Representatives in 2012, increasing their delegation to 45 out of 120 seats. 12 seats fell
within a 5% margin of victory; see also November 4, 2014 Gen. Election, FLA. DEP’T OF
STATE http://election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/4
/2014&DATAMODE=. After the 2014 elections, Republicans increased their majority to
81 seats. 7 seats fell within the 5% margin of error.
233
Dave Trotter, New Senate redistricting plan out, GOP and incumbents with large
advantages, THE POLITICAL HURRICANE (Mar. 17, 2012) http://thepoliticalhurricane.com/
2012/03/17/new-senate-redistricting-plan-out-gop-and-incumbents-with-largeadvantages/.
234
Id. Trotter writes that Democrats could peak at 15 seats, but likely end up with 14 or
less out of 40.
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from the gerrymandered 2002 maps that consistently produced a
Republican majority.235 While Democrats hold a small advantage in voter
registration statewide, Republicans would have an advantage in 21 seats
under the court-approved plan and 22 seats under the old plan.236
However, while Democrats hold registration advantages in these
districts, Democratic candidates perform worse than their registration
advantages.237 Under the old map, Democratic Gubernatorial candidate
Alex Sink would have won 14 seats in 2010, and President Obama 16
seats in 2008.238 Under the revised map, Democrats would be projected
to pick up one more seat.239
The districts unsurprisingly performed as predicted. In 2012, in a
good year for Democrats, Democrats gained two Senate seats to reach
14, ending the Republican supermajority, but still rendering Democrats a
clear legislative minority.240 However, only one district was truly
competitive, District 34, pitting two incumbents against one another.241
The streak of incumbency continued into 2014, a year of Republican
gains.242 Ten Senate seats were up for reelection, and incumbents won
every seat by more than 15%, except for the District 34 rematch between
Senators Sachs and Bogdanoff.243 Despite two disparate election cycles,
only one Senate incumbent lost re-election over the two cycles, and this
was in the only competitive district. Clearly, the purpose of the
Amendments has been frustrated with almost unanimous incumbent
success, limited competitiveness, and an almost guaranteed majority for
the next decade. Given these results, the Florida Supreme Court should
235

See The Prophet, Comment to Redistricting Saga: Senate Still Does Not Get It, THE
(Mar. 18, 2012) http://thepoliticalhurricane.com/2012/03/18/redis
tricting-saga-senate-still-does-not-get-it/ (noting that the 2002 districts were meant to
elect 26 Republican Senators, and that the new Fair Districts standards produced a map
that reflected a partisan gerrymander of the past).
236
Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 896 (Pariente, J., concurring).
237
See Kevin Cate, Commentary: Fla. Democrats Should Change the Rules, Again.
PALM BEACH POST (Nov. 16, 2014 3:27 PM) http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/
opinion/commentary-florida-democrats-should-change-the-rul/nh7QX/. This is because
of lower Democratic turnout in non-presidential year elections, and Dixiecrats,
conservatives who used to vote Democratic, but vote Republican for most major
elections.
238
Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 896.
239
Id.
240
Id
241
See November 6, 2012 General Election, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE http://election.dos.sta
te.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/6/2012&DATAMODE.
Then-Representative Maria Sachs defeated Senator Ellyn Bogdanoff by 5.6%. No district
was decided by a margin of less than 5%.
242
See November 4, 2014 General Election, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE, http://election.dos
.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/4/2014&DATAMODE.
243
Id.
POLITICAL HURRICANE
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have been able to infer intent to protect incumbents and the Republican
Party.
The decision to invalidate eight Senate Districts was not
insignificant. But the individual changes did little to shift electoral
outcomes. The fixing of Districts 1 and 3 still produced two safe
Republican seats.244 The alterations of Districts 6 and 9 produced a
minority-performing district surrounded by safe Republican seats.245
Additionally, old districts 10 and 30 remain Republican-performing
despite becoming more compact.246 The fixing of the South Florida
districts did produce an additional Democratic seat, preventing a
supermajority. Old District 29 would have been a competitive, but
Republican leaning seat.247 But after the Senate made 29 and 34 more
compact, new District 34 became a Democratic-leaning seat.248 Given the
shift in partisan demographics, it is likely that Democrats garnered an
extra seat until 2022.249 In the end, the new Senate map created “nicerlooking” districts, but only impacted one race. If voters wanted to “level
the playing field,” then nicer-looking districts won’t cut it if incumbents
and party control are protected.250

C. Congressional Modifications
Similar issues emerged from the decision to accept the Florida
Legislature’s modified congressional map. In terms of fairness and
244

See November 4, 2014 General Election, Districts 1 and 2 (old District 3) both have
large Republican registration advantages and performance.
245
Id. The modifications may have had a small impact on District 8 to the South, which
is split evenly by voter registration, but performed for the Republican candidate in 2012.
Id. Note that the Jacksonville-based minority opportunity district was renumbered as 9,
and its old bordering district as number 6.
246
Id. The appendage to avoid an incumbent versus incumbent battle turned out to be
unnecessary, and both incumbents ran in different districts and got elected.
247
Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 676. It would have voted 47.7% for
Democratic gubernatorial candidate Alex Sink in 2010, and 48.7% for Democratic
gubernatorial candidate Jim Davis in 2006. However, Obama would have won the seat
with 51% in 2008.
248
Anthony Man & Aaron Deslatte, Sens. Bogdanoff, Sachs in South Fla. Showdown,
SUNSENTINEL (Apr. 27, 2012) http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2012-04-27/news/fl-senateredistricting-plan-upheld-20120427_1_bogdanoff-of-fort-lauderdale-maria-sachsrepublican-ellyn-bogdanoff.
249
The shift from a district nearly equal in voter registration to one in which Democrats
have a 56% share of the two party vote probably accounts for the margin between the two
candidates. Sachs won by over four percent in a GOP-friendly cycle. 2014 General
Election Active Registered Voters by Senate District, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE (Oct. 18,
2014, 10:13 AM) http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/statistics/pdf/2014/GEN
2014_CountyPartySenateDist.pdf.
250
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 605.
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incumbency challenges, the congressional map was fairer than the Senate
map.251 However, a majority of incumbents have won re-election
comfortably.252 The changes to the congressional map were
insignificant.253 While District 5 became more compact, and lost some
black Democrats to District 10, the changes only make a heavily
Democratic district slightly less Democratic, and a moderate GOP
district slightly less red, but clearly favorable towards Republicans.254
Simply put, a slight modification cannot cure a map with improper
intent.

D. Competing Tier-One Requirements
Most of what has been discussed, supra, involves the inference of
intent from deviation from tier-two requirements. But some of the most
difficult cases involve the creation of minority protection districts. While
compliance with minority voter protections is required under the
Amendments, conservative legislators can use these protections as a
pretext to pack black voters into districts to “bleach” neighboring
districts of black, Democratic voters. America’s history of suppressing
the black vote makes minority protection a compelling interest, but
where should a court draw the line between necessary protection and
excessive packing for political gain?255
251

November 6, 2012 General Election, supra note 241. Six incumbents lost primary or
general elections during that span. Two more filled open seats.
252
Id. Most incumbents won by comfortable margins overt the span.
253
See Philip Bump & Aaron Blake, Florida’s Proposed New Congressional Map
Looks Familiar, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2014) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/thefix/wp/2014/08/07/floridas-proposed-redistricting-redraw-looks-pretty-familiar/.
254
Bump & Blake, supra note 253 (concluding that the redraw would not have a huge
impact on the GOP’s majority in Florida or nationwide); see also supra notes 232 and
241. Both incumbents won re-election in 2012 and 2014. District 10 was a 54-46
Romney-performing district in 2012. Its black population increased from 10 to 12.2%;
see also Fla. H. R. Elections, supra note 232; November 6, 2012 General Election, supra
note 241.
255
Richard H. Pildes, Is the Voting-Rights Law Now at War With Itself? Soc. Sci. and
Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV 1517 (2002). Richard H. Pildes believes that
coalition districts may be sufficient in terms of ensuring that minority voters can elect a
candidate, because white voters are now willing to elect minority candidates at a higher
rate; Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan
Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553 (2011). Adam Cox and Richard T. Holden take
a different approach, holding that the Voting Rights Act benefits Democrats more than
Republicans in that it constrains Republicans from denying minority voters at least one
representative. They hold that the “pack-and-crack” model is not the most efficient; see
also Stephen Wolf, What if Legislators Didn’t Have to Draw Majority-Minority Dists.?
Democrats Would Lose Big, DAILY KOS, (Mar. 09, 2014 1:59 PM)
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/03/09/1270976/-What-if-legislators-didn-t-have-todraw-majority-minority-districts-Democrats-would-lose-big (performing an analysis of
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The issue of retrogression is tricky. If a minority population in a
district is significant but not substantial (such as in District 8), the
legislature in the next redistricting cycle will not have a high benchmark
minority population, potentially hurting the minority’s chances to elect a
candidate.256 On the other hand, a district with a high minority population
could require that a subsequent district also contain a high minority
proportion.257 For example Florida’s 5th Congressional District was
required to stretch from Jacksonville to Orlando to come near to a 45%
black VAP, because the benchmark district was a plurality district.258 The
compliance with such minority voting protections can often overshadow
partisan intent.259 Courts should thus be wary of underlying partisan
motives behind the use of minority-protection districts. In order to make
the right decision, the legislature must look at the totality of the
circumstances to determine how much support the minority candidate
would need to get elected. The Senate had several districts invalidated
for not performing a functional analysis as to when to apply minority
protection provisions.260 The Florida Supreme Court appears to be
willing to invalidate districts if they are over-packed with minority voters
and flexible on the non-retrogression issue. This seems to be a good first
step in this part of the redistricting litigation.

V.

TRACKING THE SUCCESSES OF OTHER REDISTRICTING
REFORMS

Other states have intent-based prohibitions on redistricting. But the
redistricting process in Florida is unique in that Florida allows its
legislature to draw the lines, in compliance with constitutional
constraints against incumbents helping themselves.261 Other states have
redistricting without the VRA requirements and concluding that removing VRA
requirements could cost Democrats 13 congressional seats, especially in the Deep South).
256
This echoes Judge Perry’s dissent, worrying that the new map split Daytona Beach’s
black population, cracking their vote into multiple districts.
257
The new district would not necessarily have to have the same percentage, but would
have to be drawn to avoid diminishing the minority’s chances of electing a candidate.
258
See Romo, 2014 WL 3797315 at 10 The State’s expert testified that at 43.6% black
VAP (voting age population), there would be a 50/50 chance of electing a minority
candidate of choice.
259
In cases where the legislature goes beyond what is necessary, and there is evidence
of partisan intent, the district can be invalidated, as was the 5th congressional district.
260
Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 656.
261
See Katie Sanders, Florida Holds the Record for Redistricting Incumbents Together,
Will Weatherford says, POLITIFACT (Apr. 13, 2012, 2:37 PM) http://www.politifact.com/fl
orida/statements/2012/apr/13/will-weatherford/florida-holds-record-redistrictingincumbents-toge/.
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prohibitions against plans that favor a party or incumbents, but these
states employ redistricting commissions in place of their legislatures.262
For example, Iowa prohibits the use of incumbent address, political
affiliations of voters, electoral results, and demographic information,
except where necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act.263 But
while these standards can serve to guide a redistricting commission, they
play a different role where the legislature is a primary redistricting body.
Since legislators have a personal interest in redistricting, it makes it more
important to have stringent guidelines against gerrymandering.
Some states allow redistricting commissions to take the process of
redistricting out of the legislature’s control. Many academics believe that
redistricting commissions produce maps that in appearance look fairer
than those created by the legislatures. However, some academics note
that redistricting commissions in the Western United States have not
necessarily created more competitive seats.264 They have, however,
created a more open and transparent redistricting process.265 It is
important to contrast politically independent redistricting commissions
from those that are dependent on partisan public officials.266 In Ohio, the
political party appointing the majority of the apportionment board has
seen gains in state legislative seats following each redistricting.267 In
contrast, models such as California’s have helped limit legislative selfinterest and have produced districts that reflected local priorities.268
In a survey, Nicholas Stephanopoulos found that margins of victory
were lower, turnout was higher, and divergence between the overall vote
and proportion of congressional seats was lower in the states that
employed a commission model.269 Employing a commission model to
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Florida redistricting would likely require an expensive political campaign
and would represent a dramatic shift in our redistricting process.270
However, most academics support statewide commissions as an effective
shield for the democratic process. The gains in political responsiveness
would justify the costs of running such a campaign. Alternatively,
proponents could seek to amend the Florida Constitution to require
competitive districts such as in Arizona, or to make the intent burden
easier to satisfy.271 This would also require an expensive campaign, but
would represent a positive shift towards greater electoral responsiveness.

CONCLUSION
The Senate argued that it would be a “Sisyphean” task to discern
improper intent.272 Certainly it is not an easy task. But Florida’s Fair
Districts Amendments make it unlike the cases of Bandemer and Vieth,
which hold that political gerrymandering cases are not justiciable,
because there are no standards to measure improper intent. In Florida,
intent to favor parties is completely forbidden. There is a standard that
the courts can apply. By assigning a greater weight to political effects
and long term patterns, along with tier-two criteria, courts can more
easily discover intent and effectuate the interests of the voters. Unless the
system changes, certain constituents will not have a chance to have their
voices heard. Instead, the majority will be beholden to the mapmakers
and special interests that continue to get them elected as opposed to
worthy policies that a potential majority of voters may support.273 In the
end, the court must choose between the interests of the Senate and that of
the voters who desire fair elections. In the meantime, Florida voters
270
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should elect people with ethics to the legislature who will comply with
the constitutional requirements. This is probably easier said than done,
however.
Florida’s new constitutional standards add might to the Florida
Supreme Court’s ability to strike the most obvious gerrymanders, and as
Hebert notes, they are a significant improvement and protection for
Florida voters.274 But the Florida Legislature continues to be trusted to
protect the interests of Florida voters. The burden of challenging districts
is high for a proponent to meet. And while tier-two principles mandate a
map that is free from bizarre districts, compliance with tier-two
principles does not necessarily mean that the map is free from partisan
intent. The creation of safe seats, the near guarantee of a majority
throughout the decade, and the near unanimous record of incumbent
successes indicate that the maps may not be free of such illicit intent.
Under the Fair Districts precedents, the courts can only do so much to
stop partisan gerrymandering, denying the ability of the voters to elect
their preferred representatives. This must change. Simply put, democracy
is too important to allow legislators to pick and choose their own
constituents. Such a practice is inconsistent with the theory that voters
should be able to choose their representatives.
In the meantime, we can only hope that our legislators have the
morals to serve the people and not the mapmakers.

274

J. Gerald Hebert and Marina K. Jenkins, The Need for State Redistricting Reform to
Rein in Partisan Gerrymandering, 29 YALE L. & POLY. REV. 543, 557 (2011).

	
  

